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INTRODUCTION 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION COSTS IN BANGLADESH 
The issue of bank viability has emerged in recent years as 
more and more countries have been forced into a critical examina-
tion of their strategy to develop banking systems, especially in 
rural areas. A number of issues have been identified: Are the 
margins authorized for financial institutions sufficient to cover 
costs? Are the level of subsidies required to support institu-
tions too large to be sustained by poor, debt-ridden governments? 
Do policies aimed at cross-subsidization (profitable lines of 
business subsidize unprofitable ones) provide adequate incentives 
to stimulate the expansion of financial services in rural areas? 
Are there economies of scale in financial intermediation in 
developing countries? Should financial institutions expand 
deposits, loans, or both to take advantage of economies of scale 
and scope? Are loan loss reserves and interest margins adequate 
to cover projected loan losses? 
Several factors contribute to high financial intermediation 
costs in developing countries. Rural infrastructure is poor so 
transportation and communication costs are high for financial 
institutions, for depositors, and for borrowers. Often times, 
supporting systems and institutions are weak or nonexistent so 
information costs are high when lenders seek to determine land 
ownership, verify financial statements, ascertain credit worthi-
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ness, etc. Lending risks are also high because agricultural 
price policies, input supplies and marketing systems are under-
developed for farmer borrowers. Deposit and loan sizes are 
frequently small so it is difficult to achieve the productivity 
of large account volumes per bank officer. 
In addition to these characteristics of developing countries 
which contribute to high intermediation costs, policies such as 
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, and credit alloca-
tions that are designed to achieve certain financial objectives 
can also increase intermediation costs. Therefore, policies must 
be analyzed not only in terms of whether or not they meet their 
intended objectives but also in terms of their impact on inter-
mediation costs. An important objective for the financial sector 
should be a steady decline in the costs of financial intermedia-
tion so returns to savers can be increased while the costs to 
borrowers are decreased. 
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussion on 
intermediation costs in Bangladesh by presenting some research 
results obtained from a study of banking costs in a sample of 
rural bank branches, and by discussing some of the policy issues 
that are implied by these results. Although these results do not 
tell the whole story about the economics of rural banking in 
Bangladesh, they raise important issues that demand attention and 
future research. If the results are substantiated by more 
comprehensive research, they will signal the need for fundamental 
changes in banking operations and policies regarding rural 
banking. 
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The paper begins with a brief discussion of some of the key 
policies influencing rural banking in Bangladesh. The second 
section summarizes some of the initial empirical results of our 
research on rural financial intermediation costs. The third 
section summarizes the impact of the loan recovery problem on 
rural banking, and the final section identifies some policy 
issues which arise from this research. 
RURAL BANKING IN BANGLADESH 
Since Liberation in 1971, the financial system in Bangladesh 
has undergone important changes (Khalily). One of the important 
early developments, of course, was the bank nationalization order 
promulgated in March 1972 and the creation of six nationalized 
commercial banks (NCB's), later reduced to four when two NCBs 
were privatized. These banks along with the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank dominate the rural financial system by holding the largest 
share of rural loans and deposits. 
A number of policies have been employed to shape the 
direction of the financial system, control its activities, and 
influence the allocation of its resources. The emphasis in this 
paper is on those policies that appear to have the greatest 
influence on the rural operations of the NCBs and BKB. This 
approach has limitations, of course, in a national banking system 
because the performance of rural branches can be influenced by 
urban branches, and vice versa. 
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Branching Policy 
The branching policies of the Bangladesh Bank are probably 
the single most important factor affecting access to financial 
services in rural areas. In 1977, a "two-for-one" branching 
policy was put into effect which required scheduled banks to open 
two new rural branches for each new urban branch licensed. 
Deposit potential and level of banking competition appear to have 
been important factors in determining the licensing of specific 
branches. From one point of view, this policy can be interpreted 
as having been successful. Rural bank branches totaled just over 
1,100 in 1977, but grew to almost 3,000 by 1982. As a result, 
rural branches represented 55 percent of the total bank network 
in 1977, but 65 percent by 1982 {Khalily). 
Doubts exist, however, as to whether or not the rural 
branches are optimally located and economically viable (World 
Bank). The issue of viability is complicated to analyze. It is 
possible that a rural branch, although uneconomical in its own 
operations, becomes profitable to the bank because of the income 
earned from a more lucrative urban branch authorized under the 
"two-for-one" policy. If this is true, it is possible that the 
demand for rural branches will fall once the choicest urban 
locations are exhausted. The slow down in expansion of rural 
branches after the termination of the "two-for-one'' policy in 
1981 suggests that this may have occurred. The transfer of some 
NCB rural branches to the BKB in recent years may have represen-
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ted an attempt by banks to rid themselves of the unprofitable 
operations that emerged because of this policy. 
Interest Rate Policy 
Both deposit and lending rates are set by the Bangladesh 
Bank and have undergone major changes only four times (1974, 
1976, 1980 and 1983) since nationalization. Although the deposit 
rate has been slightly higher in rural branches than urban 
branches, much of the time the weighted average deposit rate has 
been negative in real terms (i.e. the rate of inflation is 
greater than the nominal deposit rate). Furthermore, the 
interest rate authorized for rural loans has often been set lower 
than the rate authorized for loans to other sectors. With higher 
deposit rates and lower loan rates, the spread between deposit 
and lending rates is generally less favorable for rural than 
urban branches. 
There are two implications of this interest rate structure. 
The first is that this rate structure should be a disincentive 
for banks to aggressively mobilize rural deposits for rural 
lending. There should be a tendency for rural deposits to flow 
through the banks to urban loans. Secondly, if this rate 
structure does not cover operating costs of rural branches, banks 
must subsidize rural operations with more profitable urban 
operations. 
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Refinance Policy 
The Bangladesh Bank has made active use of refinance 
policies. The objectives are reported to be: a) subsidize the 
losses of public enterprises, b) provide financial resources to 
specialized institutions such as the BKB, c) accommodate seasonal 
fluctuations in credit, and d) provide funds to NCBs so they can 
profitably lend to preferential sectors (World Bank). Rural 
credit is one of the categories of loans that has benefited from 
this policy. Perhaps this policy was intended to offset the 
disincentives of higher deposit rates on rural deposits and lower 
lending rates on rural loans. 
During the early 1980s, rural credit could be refinanced at 
50 percent at an interest rate of 6 percent with a maximum 
lending rate of 12 percent. At the same time, the weighted 
average bank interest rate on all deposits was 7 to 7.5 percent. 
In 1983, the interest rate structure was modified to increase the 
cost of refinance funds so that deposit mobilization would be a 
more attractive source of loan funds, and to raise the lending 
rate on rural loans so there would be more incentives to lenders 
for rural lending. Prior to this change, it was logical for 
banks to mobilize rural deposits for urban lending and use 
refinance funds rather than deposits for rural lending. 
Loan Targeting 
Loan targeting is a common practice in Bangladesh, in part 
because of the large number of international agencies providing 
foreign aid. Each donor and/or project identifies a specific 
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target group and/or loan purpose and a special credit line is 
created for each with specified loan amounts and conditions. 
Each of these projects requires some type of reporting mechanism 
to satisfy the sponsors and/or the government. Furthermore, the 
government desires information on the progress of lending for 
certain crops or purposes. 
These information needs result in the demand for large 
amounts of data which must be collected and processed by banks 
and bank branches. This reporting system can impose large costs 
on banks. One bank, for example, developed a reporting form with 
150 separate rows to account for the individual credit lines that 
were available. The apparently ''cheap" funds available from in-
ternational sources have turned out to be expensive for financial 
institutions to administer in several other countries. This may 
also be the case in Bangladesh. 
INTERMEDIATION COSTS IN BANGLADESH 
Although there are a few studies concerning rural borrowing 
costs in Bangladesh, there appear to be almost none concerning 
rural intermediation costs of financial institutions. Presumably 
there are studies and information available in the Bangladesh 
Bank and in the head off ices of individual banks which are not 
widely circulated. Therefore, we undertook a study of bank 
branches in collaboration with R. R. Nathan Associates as part of 
the AID Rural Finance Project. The primary objective was to 
estimate a cost function for use in analyzing margins and 
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economies of scale and scope. We expected to find that inter-
mediation costs would be high, that these costs can be reduced by 
expanding average branch size, and that scope economies can be 
realized through multi-purpose rather than specialized institu-
tions. 
The approach used in this research was to estimate a 
translog cost function for a sample of branches in which costs 
are assumed to be dependent on output leveJs and input prices.1/ 
From this cost function, economically important properties can be 
derived, such as economies of scale and scope, and average costs 
and marginal costs of deposit mobilization and lending. 
The data used in this study were obtaihed from semi-annual 
income-expense statements of bank branches for the two years of 
1983 and 1984. Quarterly data on loans and deposits for these 
branches were obtained from the Bangladesh Bank data tape of the 
reports submitted by the branches. The branches included in the 
study are part of the sample compiled by the R. R. Nathan team 
and include the following number of branches for each bank: 
Agrani - 40, BKB - 42, Janata - 43, Rupali - 19 and Sonali -
46.~/ Most branches fall within the category of "rural" as 
defined by the Bangladesh Bank. 
Total costs were defined to include all operating/ad-
ministrative expenses net of depreciation and bad debt reserves. 
Two alternative definitions of bank output were used: number and 
--~------
value of deposits and loans outstanding. Loan and deposit sizes 
were introduced to control for heterogeneity of transactions. 
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The input categories were defined as labor and capital. The unit 
cost of labor was measured as total personnel costs including 
benefits divided by the total number of employees. The unit 
price of capital was obtained by summing the major capital 
expenses such as rent and depreciation, and dividing by the value 
of deposit and loan balances outstanding at the end of the 
period. 
The results of the econometric model are not presented here. 
Suffice to say that the values for the system R2 were reasonably 
high (usually above 0.50), most estimates have the sign predicted 
by theory and are statistically significant. 
The data in Table 1 report the means of the variables used 
to estimate the cost functions. There are some interesting 
patterns in these data, many of which seem consistent with 
general knowledge and impressions about rural bank branches. 
Labor represents a far greater share of total costs than capital. 
The average size of a branch (measured by adding loans and 
deposits together) is largest for BKB and Sonali compared to the 
other three, but the combination of assets and liabilities is 
quite different among the banks. Loans exceed deposits by a wide 
margin in BKB, they are roughly equal in Sonali, but deposits 
exceed loans in the remaining NCBs. Average deposit size is 
particularly small for BKB compared to the other banks, while 
average loan size is fairly similar for the banks except for 
Agrani Bank. 
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caution is required in drawing many inferences from these 
data. The results are obviously related to the choice of 
branches included in the sample and the age of the branches 
selected. Costs are probably high during the start-up phase of a 
new branch and decline as deposit and loan volumes increase. 
Furthermore, these are mean values and the distributjon of 
branches around the mean may be different among the banks. 
Tables 2 through 6 report the preliminary results obtained 
from the model for intermediation costs and related costs 
concepts using alternative definitions of output. A number of 
consistent patterns emerge: 
1. Deposit mobilization costs represent a large share of 
total costs for Agrani, Janata and Rupali, a smaller 
share for Sonali and an even smaller share for BKB. 
These results suggest that the three NCB's put propor-
tionately more effort into deposjt mobilization than do 
Sonali and BKB. BKB does not have as strong a tradi-
tion of deposit mobilization as the others, and Sonali 
has preferred access to some deposits because of its 
treasury role. 
2. The average and marginal costs per loan account are 
higher for all banks than the average and marginal 
costs per deposit account. This finding is consistent 
with the data in Table 1 that show average loan size is 
greater than average size of deposit account. MarginaJ 
lending costs are always below average lending costs so 
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there is an opportunity for these branches to reduce 
costs by expanding loans. Lending costs are lowest for 
BKB, followed by Sonali, then the other three banks. 
3. Marginal costs of deposit mobilization are always lower 
than average costs. Deposit mobilization costs are 
lowest for Sonali, followed by BKB, and the other three 
banks. 
4. Consistent with the above results, the overall marginal 
costs for intermediation are less than average costs 
indicating that these branches on average are located 
on the declining portion of a U-shaped cost curve. 
Average costs per taka of deposits and loan balances 
vary from 3.2 to 7.1 percent. Sonali and BKB appear to 
have similarly low costs followed by the other three 
banks. 
5. The estimates of economies of scale indicate either 
constant returns to scale, i.e., the estimate is not 
significantly different than one for Agrani and Rupali, 
or increasing returns to scale, i.e. the estimate is 
less than one for BKB, Janata and Sonali. These 
results indicate that the mean level of branch activity 
is in the constant or the decreasing portion of the 
cost curve. 
6. The estimates of the partial economies of scale 
(percentage increase in costs associated with a one 
percent increase in one of the bank services) indicate 
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increasing returns to both lending and deposit mobil-
ization, but the economies of one are relatively more 
pronounced compared to the other depending on the bank. 
They are lowest for loans in Agrani, Janata, and 
Rupali, whereas they are lowest for deposits in BKB and 
Sonali. This implies that the most efficient branch 
expansion strategy for the former is to increase loans, 
while for the latter two institutions it is to increase 
deposits. 
7. The estimates of cost complementarity are fairly close 
to zero in all cases, except Rupali, although of 
negative sign in most cases, suggesting that these 
banks enjoy reduced costs by engaging in both lending 
and deposit mobilization rather than by specializing in 
one or the other banking function. 
Some general conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, 
there is quite a wide range among banks (and among branches of 
the same bank) in overall intermediation costs. In an earlier 
paper, we reported that the average gross interest rate spreads 
ranged from 2.6 to 3.1 percent for the sample branches in four of 
these banks for 1983 and 1984 (Srinivasan and Meyer, 1987a).~/ 
Therefore, none of the rural banks can cover the average opera-
tional costs of their rural branches with these interest spreads. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next section, these data 
make no allowance for loan losses. These results suggest that 
the profitability of rural branches is much less than the 5 to 6 
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percent margin between weighted average deposit and lending rates 
reported for scheduled banks in 1983 and 1984.1/ 
Second, all branches operating at less than the mean level 
of operations for the respective bank would benefit from an 
expansion in scale of operations. This expansion would be 
profitable until reaching the average level of operation in those 
banks with constant returns to scale (Agrani and Rupali), and 
even beyond that level for those with increasing returns (BKB, 
Janata and Sonali). 
Third, the expansion in scale of branch operations should be 
unbalanced, i.e. the results suggest that BKB and Sonali should 
expand deposits relatively more than loans, while the other three 
banks should expand loans relatively more than deposits. Such 
expansion could lead to an increase in intrabank flow of funds. 
This analysis cannot predict, of course, whether or not this 
expansion can easily occur with the current number and geographic 
distribution of bank branches in rural areas. 
Fourth, the banking policies pursued by the government have 
resulted in an expansion of branches, deposits mobilized and 
rural lending. Much remains to be done, however, to assure the 
profitability of these branches. It appears that the scale of 
operation of many branches is small and this contributes to the 
relatively high cost of financial intermediation. For reasons 
discussed below, it is not clear if there are too many branches 
for the volume of banking business available, if the geographic 
distribution of branches is inappropriate, if the branches are 
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poorly managed, or if the banks are not aggressive enough in 
pursuing more business. 
Fifth, these results suggest significant differences between 
banks but the reasons for such differences are not well under-
stood, and can only be clarified through more detailed analysis. 
Improvement in bank performance requires an identification of 
those efficiencies that can be achieved by improved management 
and resource use in a specific branch, and those that require a 
streamlining of the operations of an entire bank. Some analysis 
is also required of the market potential and competitive condi-
tions within each local banking area. 
THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF LOAN RECOVERY 
Because of the seriousness of rural loan delinquency that we 
discussed in our December seminar, we must evaluate how the loan 
recovery problem relates to the results of this paper. Two 
points are important to remember in this methodology. First, the 
resource costs (labor, capital, materials) incurred by bank 
branches in all aspects of loan monitoring, loan collection, 
legal processes to recover bad debts, etc. are included as costs 
as long as they are accounted for in the branch income-expense 
reports. Therefore, the cost of loan recovery is included jn the 
estimates presented above. Second, no adjustments are made in 
the cost estimates for future loan losses so it is implicitly 
assumed that all loans made are recovered. The implication is 
that bank branches would just break-even jf the interest spreads 
15 
actually covered the transaction costs reported above, and all 
loans were repaid. 
Unfortunately, many loans made by rural branches are not 
repaid in Bangladesh so the transaction costs estimates reported 
above represent the low.er b2~n_g for the minimum interest spread 
required to cover costs. To obtain a more realistic estimate of 
the minimum interest spread required for unsubsidized operations, 
appropriate provisions must be made for bad debts. A casual 
review of bank financial statements suggests that reserves for 
bad debts must be too low unless very optimistic estimates are 
made about improvements in loan recovery. 
Some important research results on loan delinquency were 
reported in our earlier seminar in papers by Cookson, and Gregory 
and Adams. A consensus emerged that the repayment situation of 
loans made by rural branches was bad, and getting worse. 
An important issue discussed at that time concerned the 
concept of loan recovery profile, and whether or not that profile 
had actually shifted downward in recent years.~/ That issue is 
related to, but somewhat distinct, from the issue of loan 
recovery rate for an entire loan portfolio. The concept of a 
loan recovery profile refers to the percent of loan principal 
repaid at various points in time after payment due date. A com-
parison of the loan recovery profile for loans made in various 
years will show if a lender is more or less successful in 
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collecting loans made in one year versus another. This com-
parison will also suggest whether or not there is a change in 
borrower behavior regarding loan repayment. 
Gregory conducted some recent analysis of rural loan 
recovery using the data collected by the R. R. Nathan team.§/ 
Table 7 reports the distribution by bank and year of 5,270 short-
term loans included in the sample of loans analyzed in the bank 
branch survey. These loans represent a subset of the total 
sample numbering approximately 9,000 loans. Long-term loans, 
overdrafts, and loans with incomplete data were eliminated to 
arrive at this subsample. 
Figure 1 shows the loan recovery profile for these short-
term loans. Several interesting features can be seen. The best 
total recovery is for loans made jn 1979. After more than five 
years after due date, the cumulative proportion of principal 
repaid reached about 65 percent. The recovery profile for loans 
made in 1980, 1981, and 1982 is fairly similar. The speed of 
loan recovery as represented by the percent of principal re-
covered within the first two or three years after due date was 
actually higher than for 1979 loans. However, the recovery 
profile for these three years flattening out at a somewhat lower 
level so we might predict that as these loans surpass five years 
after due date the cumulative amount of principal recovered may 
reach 60 rather than 65 percent. 
A sharp change in loan recovery profile appears to have 
occurred with loans made in 1983 and 1984. Three years after due 
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date, only 42 percent oi the principal was recovered for loans 
made in 1983 compared to 50 to 58 percent for loans made in 
earlier years. Ljkewise, the loan recovery profile two years 
after due date is much worse for loans made in 1984 compared to 
loans made in other y~ars. If these trends continue, the percent 
of principal eventually recovered after five years for 1983 and 
1984 loans may be far less than 60 percent. These data show that 
loan recovery for short-term loans has clearly deteriorated over 
time for these sample bank branches. Perhaps the political 
uncertainty that emerged in Bangladesh about 1982 and the 
interest forgiveness programs that followed may have contributed 
to reducing loan recovery performance for all loans made before 
and after that date. 
The implication of this loan recovery situation is clear. 
The future profitability of the bank branches surveyed will 
depend much more on loan recovery performance than on any fine-
tuning of banking operations which reduces costs. It is impos-
sible to raise interest margins enough to cover forty percent 
loan default. The costs of loan default swamp all other costs. 
The only way rural bank branches can remain operational is 
through huge subsidies provided to them either from the head 
offices of the banks or the government. At a minimum, these 
subsidies will equal 40 percent of the value of short-term loans 
made. The subsidies, in effect, will flow through the banking 
system to those borrowers who convert their loans into grants by 
defaulting. This raises two important social questions. Are the 
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persons who receive these grants the citizens that Bangladesh 
wants to subsidize in this way?l/ Is the magnitude of subsidy so 
large that it will sabotage the future exp~nsion of rural banking 
and/or of rural lending? 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The results reported in this paper are subject to modifica-
tion as they are reviewed and analyzed in greater detail. 
Furthermore, we had to rely on the data as reported by the banks 
and have no independent means to assess its quality. We have no 
reason to believe, however, that there are serious problems in 
the data or the analysis so we are confident that the conclusions 
presented here are robust. The sample of bank branches was 
carefully drawn so the results should be fairly representative of 
the rural banking system. The impact of any changes made in 
rural banking after 1984 are not, of course, represented in this 
analysis. More comprehensive studies are needed to test these 
issues and incorporate the possible effects of recent changes 
into the analysis. 
These findings suggest several implications for policy 
makers in Bangladesh: 
1. Loan recovery is the number one rural finance challenge 
today. Failure to effectively improve recovery will 
require enormous bank subsidies that will probably 
sabotage the future expansion of efficient rural 
banking and rural lending. 
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2. Branches operating at a scale less than the mean level 
for their respective bank sample should expand opera-
tions to take advantage of economies of scale. The 
type of expansion which is most efficient (more loans 
versus more deposits} varies by bank. 
3. Economies of scope imply that multi-purpose institu-
tions that both mobilize deposits and make loans will 
likely be more efficient than specialized institutions 
that engage in providing just one type of financial 
service. 
4. Interest margins must be adjusted so that the transac-
tion costs of rural branches are covered by income. 
Interest rate levels should be determined by building 
from the bottom up, i.e. establish deposit rates which 
provide incentives to depositors, then add an interest 
margin sufficient to cover bank costs. 
5. The current technology for managing deposits and loans 
must be analyzed, and cost-reducing technologies 
developed to lower bank transaction costs over time. 
Special attention must be given to the information 
demands placed on banks, the costs these demands imply, 
and the value of such information if it makes little 
contribution to more efficient banking. 
6. Expanding financial services in rural Bangladesh 
requires a balancing of bank and bank customer transac-
tion costs. The Khalily research revealed the impor-
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tance of number of bank branches for deposit mobiliza-
tion by reducing transaction costs for depositors. Low 
depositor transaction costs imply a large number of 
widely distributed branches. The research reported 
here, however, shows the importance of increasing 
average branch size to reduce bank intermediation 
costs. Additional analysis is needed to determine if 
the current number and geographjc distribution of 
branches is appropriate to simultaneously meet the 
objective of reduced customer transaction costs and 
increased bank efficiency. There may be important 
trade-offs so that rural customers will gladly pay 
higher costs for bank services because the branch is 
small, but is located nearby. 
21 
REFERENCES 
Ali, A.M.M. Shawkat, "F?ural Power Structure and Agricultural 
Credit", Paper Presented at the Seminar on Issues in Rural 
Loan Recovery in Bangladesh, Dhaka, December 1986. 
Cookson, Jr., Forrest E., "Loan Recovery in the Rural Finance 
Sector", Paper Presented at the Seminar on Issues in Rural 
Loan Recovery in Bangladesh, Dhaka, December 1986. 
Cuevas, Carlos E., "Intermediation Costs and Scale Economies of 
Banking Under Financial Regulations in Honduras", Un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 
1984. 
Gregory, Gregory L. and Dale W. Adams, "Severity of Rural Loan 
Recovery Problems in Bangladesh", Paper Presented at the 
Seminar on Issues in Rural Loan Recovery in Bangladesh, 
Dhaka, December 1986. 
Khalily, M.A.B., "Determinants of Rural Deposit Behavior in 
Developing Countries: The Bangladesh Case", Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1987. 
Meyer, Richard L., "Rural Loan Recovery Concepts and Measures 11 , 
Paper Presented at the Seminar on Issues in Rural Loan 
Recovery in Bangladesh, Dhaka, December 1986. 
Srinivasan, Aruna and Richard L. Meyer, "Financial Analysis of 
Banks in Bangladesh 11 , Unpublished Paper, Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, April 1987a. 
Srinivasan, Aruna and Richard L. Meyer, "Transaction Costs of 
Rural Bank Branches in Bangladesh", Paper Presented at the 
Annual Meetings of the American Agricultural Economics 
Association, Ea.st Lansing, Michigan, August 1987b. 
World Bank, ~an_g_lades!l: Financial Sector Review, Washington, 
D.C., 1982. 
22 
FOOTNOTES 
1. This research is part of the Ph.D. dissertation being 
prepared by the junior author. The theory and econometric 
model are summarized in Srinivasan and Meyer (1987b). The 
general methodology followed the procedures developed by 
Cuevas in his study of Honduras banks. 
2. Details on sample selection are found in project reports 
prepared by Cookson. 
3. Data were not analyzed for Sonali Bank. These results were 
obtained by analyzing branch level balance sheets and income 
statements. 
4. As reported in ~-C:.9J19m~c Trends, August, 1985. 
5. This issue was discussed in a paper by Meyer. 
6. We are indebted to Forrest E. Cookson for providing the raw 
data and to Greg Gregory for assembling these results and 
sharing them with us. 
7. The paper by Ali provides some insights into the issue of 
loan repayment by rural elites. 
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.:) 1 .jc~•.J T ~:..; 
3,557,76~ 
2,450 
3,496 
43 
--·----··-··--·-------------··--·------·-··-----------
a/ Avera;~ for the ~oo~ec s~~~1s, '.983 3rci ~984 
-QI Capitai costs me3sured in taka pe~ taKa of total deposits and leans 
~61,806 261 ,244 
15,892 12,iiS 
C.0016 0.0038 
:.8~ G. 77 
-
,..,r ,, 
. " 
5,CC1,013 6,455,717 
:~:2Jrc:s 6,054,897 
2,3S3 2,988 
·3, 773 3,280 
• :l I." ~c 
24 
Table 2 
Lender's Intermediation Costs 
and Related Cost Concepts for Agrani ~/ 
----------·--------~wu:t -~~-i1-}tt~p~ ________ _ 
Value of Deposit Number of Deposit 
Cost ~---------and=:;:_,;:;L=oOaI~n-'Ba=l;;;,;;:an=c.;;;._es ____ ---'-'and~"""'Loan~""'-Ac~c;...;a"'""un_ts 
Cost Share in Total 
_!nte~iat-i_QI1 ~t~ 
1. Deposit M::>biliza.tian Costs 
2. Len:iing Costs 
3. Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
Costs of r-t:>bilizing Deposits 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
Overall Intermediation Costs 
7. Average Costs 
8. Marginal Costs 
9. Econanies of Scale 
Partial Econanies of Scale 
10. Dep:lsits 
11. Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
70.6% 
29.4% 
2.88% 
0.80% 
4.22% 
2.80% 
7.10% 
3.60% 
0.94 
0.66 
0.28 
-0.099 
65.7% 
34.3% 
4.80% 
1.48% 
1.86% 
1.10% 
6.66% 
2.58% 
0.90 
0.59 
0.31 
0.079 
-----------------·- - -·~--.. -~ -· #--· ---- ----
~Results of cost-system estimations evaluated at the geometric means 
of the variables in the models. 
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Table 3 
Lender's Intennediation Costs 
and Related Cost Concepts for BKB ~ 
------ - - ------
Cqst_ ~ep_:!:; _____________ _ 
_Qqs_1;_ §~~_).n __ 'J;'.9'.t;~l 
In!~~!~!J.QD, G~!§ 
1. Deposit Mobilization Costs 
2. Lending Costs 
3. Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
0Ve~~1i ~µterrneQ._iation Costs 
7. Average Costs 
8. MarginaJ Costs 
9. Economies of Scale 
10. Deposits 
11. Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
____ OU_tpu __ t ~J_;ini tion ____ _ 
Value of Deposit Number of Deposit 
and Loan Balances and Loan Accounts 
23.64% 
76.36% 
0.87% 
0.36% 
2.55% 
0.34% 
3.42% 
0.70% 
0.55 
0.13 
0.42 
-0.027 
21.82% 
78 .18% 
1.05% 
0.45% 
0.65% 
0.08% 
1.70% 
0.53% 
0.55 
0.12 
0.43 
0.156 
----------
§/Results of cost-system estimations evaluated at the geometric means 
of the variables in the models. 
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Table 4 
Lender's Intennediation Costs 
and Related Cost Concepts for Janata ~ 
Cost Concept 
Cost Share in Total 
In!;~~:;_ation Costs 
1. Deposit M:>bilization Costs 
2. Lending Costs 
3. Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
Costs of _M:?bilizing Deposits 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
OVerall Intennediation Cost~ 
7. Average Costs 
8. Marginal Costs 
9. Econanies of Scale 
Partial Economies of Scale 
10. Deposits 
11. Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
D:µtput J>e_filli_t._~9n_ ______ _ 
Value of Deposit Number of Deposit 
and Loan Balances and Loan Accounts 
62.50% 
37.50% 
2.57% 
0.86% 
2.70% 
1.48% 
5.27% 
2.34% 
0.88 
0.55 
0.33 
0.023 
70.73% 
29.57% 
3.56% 
0.86% 
1.78% 
1.04% 
5.34% 
1.90% 
0.82 
0.58 
0.24 
0.225 
s!Results of cost-system estimations evaluated at the geometric means 
of the variables in the models. 
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Table 5 
Lender's Intermediation Costs 
and Related Cost Concepts for Rupali Bank~/ 
__ ou_._1:.P!:!t Definition ____ _ 
Value of Deposit Number of Deposit 
Qc?st Qonc,ept __________ -----· ~ Loan Balances and Loan Accounts 
Qost_§_hare___l.n_ 1:Qi;aj 
Inte~_i§~~Qll:-~~~ 
1. Deposit t-bbilization Costs 
2. LendinJ Costs 
3 . Average Costs 
4. Marginal Costs 
5. Average Costs 
6 . Marginal Costs 
7. Average Costs 
8 . Marginal Costs 
9 . Economies of Scale 
10. Deposits 
11. Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
62.63% 
37.37% 
3.89% 
1.43% 
2.36% 
1.46% 
6.25% 
2.89% 
0.99 
0.62 
0.37 
0.698 
70.97% 
29.03% 
5.75% 
1.55% 
1.91% 
1.27% 
7.66% 
2.82% 
0.93 
0.66 
0.27 
-1.742 
¥Results of cost-system estimations evaluated at the geometric means 
of the variables in the models. 
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Table 6 
Lender's Intermediation Costs 
and Related Cost Concepts for SOnali ~/ 
--- ---·- - "~ .,._ --- - -- ---~---..... -._ 
-·---- _Ol:lt;~"!;_-~f-1:.11!_tioI)_ ... 
Value of Deposit Number of Deposit 
Cost Conce:Qt ----------=and=-'Loan==-=Ba=lan=c;..;;:es=-_ _..;;and='--'Loan==:.;::;;;...=A=cc=oun==t=-s 
Cost S~~ in Total 
Intermed.l~tiQ!l_ ~ts 
1. Deposit M:>biliza.tion Costs 
2 • Lerxiing Costs 
3. Average Costs 
4 . Marginal Costs 
Costs of M:>bilizing Dep:?Sits 
5. Average Costs 
6. Marginal Costs 
OVerall IntermeC!_iation ~-~ 
7. Average Costs 
8. Marginal Costs 
9. Econanies of Scale 
Partial Economies of Scale 
10. Dep:>sits 
11. Loans 
12. Cost Complementarities 
44.16% 
55.84% 
1.96% 
0.84% 
1.28% 
0.44% 
3.24% 
1.28% 
0.77 
0.34 
0.43 
-0.019 
46.75% 
53.25% 
2.36% 
0.96% 
1.09% 
0.39% 
3.45% 
1.35% 
0.77 
0.36 
0.41 
-0.024 
~/Results of cost-system estimations evaluated at the geometric means 
of the variables in the models. 
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Table 7 
Number of Sample Short-Term Loans 
by Year and l3anl< 
YEAR 
BANK 1979 1980 1981 1!)82 1983 1984 1985 'TOTAL 
Agrani 74 146 54 166 395 ms 2 1.032 
Janat..l l-17 110 ·l3 100 288 46 734 
Rupali 27 17 13 63 205 77 402 
Sonali 49 362 216 227 605 364 26 1,849 
BKB 45 75 110 238 425 352 8 1,253 
TOTAL 342 710 436 794 1,918 1,034 36 5,270 
Loan Recovery Profile for Short-Term 
Ayricultural Loans Made in 1979-1984: 
Al 1 Banl<S 
Percent of Principal Recovered 
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